An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature scheme that allows aggregation of n distinct signatures by n distinct users on n distinct messages. In this paper, we present an aggregate signcryption scheme (ASC) that is useful for reducing the size of certification chains (by aggregating all signatures in the chain) and for reducing message size in secure routing protocols. The new ASC scheme combines identity-based encryption and the aggregation of signatures in a practical way that can simultaneously satisfy the security requirements for confidentiality and authentication. We formally prove the security of the new scheme in a random oracle model with respect to security properties IND-CCA2, AUTH-CMA2, and EUF-CMA.
I. Introduction
An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature scheme, the concept of which was first proposed by Boneh and others [1] . Aggregate signature allows aggregation of different signatures by n different users ID i on different messages m i . The primary objective of an aggregate signature scheme is to achieve both computation and communication efficiency. In aggregate signature, multiple signatures from various users are combined into a single compact signature. Aggregation can be used to reduce the certificate chains in public key infrastructure (PKI) settings. The aggregate signature has many real world applications ranging from traffic control to documents signed by directors of a company for official purpose.
In certain scenarios, one may need to hide the sending message so that only the receiver will be able to get back the message. In such cases, signcryption comes into the picture. Consider the scenario of an online opinion poll. The verifier has to ensure that all the concerned persons have polled their votes in an efficient way, but one may want his opinion to be secret. Only the verifier will be able to decrypt the messages and get the opinions. Consider another scenario where the directors of a company have to vote on some controversial issue. Each of them wants their vote to be hidden from others since it may disrupt the friendly atmosphere prevailing in the company. In both of these cases, aggregate signcryption can be used to increase efficiency, provide secrecy, and decrease the communication overhead. Aggregate signcryption also has applications in military communication.
The concept of public key signcryption was proposed by Zheng [2] . The idea of this kind of cryptographic primitive is to perform encryption and signature in a single logical step to obtain confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation more efficiently than the sign-then-encrypt approach. Identity-based cryptosystems (IBCs) were first introduced by Shamir in 1984 [3] . IBCs eliminate trust problems Provably Secure Aggregate Signcryption Scheme Xun-Yi Ren, Zheng-Hua Qi, and Yang Geng encountered in certificate-based PKIs: There is no need to bind a public key to its owner's identity since they function as a singular element. Malone-Lee [4] developed the first identity-based signcryption scheme. Selvi and others [5] proposed an identitybased threshold signcryption scheme and formally proved its security in the existing security model. Muniz and Laud [6] proposed the first strong forward-secure identity-based signcryption scheme.
Gentry and Ramzan [7] proposed an efficient identity-based aggregate signature scheme. This scheme achieves both full aggregation and also a constant number of pairing operations during signature verification. Selvi and others [8] , [9] analyzed the security in some of the existing aggregate signature schemes [10] - [12] and proposed two identity-based aggregate signature schemes. However, Selvi and others [9] presented the security model for unforgeability but not the security proof. The scheme proposed in [9] cannot be considered an identitybased system because the user's public key in Selvi and others' scheme is not an identity-based public key.
Selvi and others [13] proposed the first identity-based aggregate signcryption along with a formal security model and a formal security proof. However, where the aggregate signature V agg in the "IBAS-1 Unsigncrypt" algorithm is the sum of unknown signature V i , they did not explain how to recover V i from V agg .
In our previous paper [14] , a new signcryption scheme (IBRSC) was presented based on identity and ring signcryption from pairings, but the essence of IBRSC is to ensure the anonymity of a user when they need to send a message confidentially and authentically to a specific receiver. The scheme cannot allow aggregation of n distinct signatures by n distinct users on n distinct messages.
In this paper, we propose an aggregate signcryption scheme (ASC) in which signature is a modification of the aggregate signature schemes in [9] . Also, we use the added advantage that identity-based cryptosystems provide an effective remedy to the key escrow problem, which is an inherent issue in IBC. In our ASC scheme, we eliminate the interaction among the senders (signers) before the signcryption generation, which reduces the communication complexity to a large extent. However, in this scheme, we are able to achieve only partial aggregation, not full aggregation. The ASC we propose can effectively improve computation and communication efficiency and has been formally proven to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability in the random oracle model.
II. Preliminaries 1. Computation Assumptions
There are some computation assumptions about preliminaries related to an ASC, such as bilinear pairing, the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem, and the discrete logarithm (DL) problem. A bilinear pairing is a map ê: G 1 × G 1 →G 2 with the bilinearity, non-degeneracy, and computability properties, where G 1 is an additive cyclic group and G 2 is a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q. Bilinearity means that given elements P, R, Q∈G 1 , then ê(P + Q, R) = ê(P, R) ê(Q, R) and ê(P, Q + R) = ê(P, Q) ê(P, R). In particular, for a, b∈Z q
). Non-degeneracy means that there exist P, Q∈G 1 , such that ê(P, Q) ≠I G2 , where I G2 is the identity element of G 2 . Computability means that there exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for all P, Q∈G 1 . The above properties can be derived from Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field [15] . For any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the BDH problem in G 1 is to compute ê (g, g) abc , and the advantage in solving the BDH problem is defined as Setup(k). Given the security parameter of the system k, the private key generator (PKG) generates the set of public parameters π and the master secret key s of the system. Key Extract(ID i ). Given an identity ID i , the PKG, using the set of public parameters π and the master secret key s, computes the corresponding private key <s i , d i >, which is transmitted to ID i in a secure way, and the public key
. Let M be the message space, W -the signcrypted message space, and R -the space of senders. We will identify any member X∈R by its identity
The sender ID i having a private key <s i , d i > runs this algorithm to generate a signcryption on message m i that will be aggregated and send it to a receiver with identity ID B . The output is a cipertext σ i ∈W. 
otherwise, the output is "Invalid." 
Definition 2.
An ASC is said to be existentially ciphertext unforgeable under adaptive chosen message outsider attack, or AUTH-ASC-CMA2 secure, if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Start. The simulator C runs Setup(k) and sends the set of public parameters π to the adversary A.
Query. The adversary A makes a polynomially bounded number of queries to the simulator C. The attack may be conducted adaptively, and allows the same queries as in the IND-ASC-CCA2 game, namely, Keygen queries, Signcrypt queries, and Unsigncrypt queries.
Forgery. A produces a new aggregate signcryption σ agg sent from a set {ID i } i=1,…, n of n users on messages {m i } i=1,…, n to a final receiver ID B ∉{ID i } i=1,…, n , where the private keys of the users in {ID i } i=1,…, n was not queried in query phase and σ i is not the output of a previous query to the Signcrypt queries.
Outcome. The adversary A wins the game if ⊥ is not returned by Unsigncrypt(σ agg , s B , d B ) .
Definition 3. An ASC is said to be existentially signature unforgeable against chosen message insider attack, or EUF-ASC-CMA secure, if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Forgery. The adversary returns a recipient identity ID B and a ciphertext σ i .
Outcome. The adversary A wins the game if: Under the private key of ID B , the ciphertext σ i is decrypted as a signed message (
(1) the private key of the user ID i ∈{ID i } i=1,…, n was not queried in query phase; (2) σ i is not the output of a previous query to the Signcrypt queries that involved m i , ID i , and recipient ID B ', and resulted in a ciphertext σ i ' whose decryption under the private key of ID B ' is the claimed forgery (ID i , ˆ, i mˆi V ).
III. ASC
We propose an ASC scheme in this section. We follow the framework of ASC that we presented in section II.2. Setup(k). Given the security parameter of the system k, the PKG chooses two groups, G 1 and G 2 , of the same prime order q, the generator g of G 1 and a bilinear map ê: 
to n, and the corresponding identity ID i (such that ∀i=1 to n, σ i is the signcryption on message m i by ID i ): Start. The simulator C sets the master public key g s = g a and gives the system public parameters to A. Phase 1. The simulator C will set the random oracles of H 0 , 
Phase 2. This phase is similar to Phase 1. However, in Phase 2, A cannot ask for Unsigncrypt on the challenge aggregate signcrypt σ agg 3. Proof of Authentication Theorem 2. The ASC proposed is secure against any probabilistic polynomial-time AUTH-ASC-CMA2 adversary A under the random oracle model if the DL problem is hard in G 1 .
Proof. On getting a DL problem instance (g, W r = ) 
W g
). The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, with some changes given in the following random oracles. 
Efficiency
The primary objective of the aggregate signature scheme is to achieve both computation and communication efficiency. Using aggregate signature schemes, signatures from different users on different messages can be aggregated into a single compact signature. We eliminate the interaction among the senders (signers) before signcryption generation, which reduces the communication complexity to a large extent. Also, our ASC is more efficient than the sign-then-encrypt approach.
We have compared our scheme (ASC) with the sign-thenencrypt scheme (AS and BF) in Table 1 , where the aggregate signature scheme (AS) is proposed in [9] and the encryption scheme (BF) is proposed in [15] . In the comparison table, |М| represents the length of a message. |G 1 | is the number of G 1 elements.
The major parameters involved in our ASC scheme are the computation costs for Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt operations. For computation cost, we mainly consider the number of pairing ê computations performed, as they are the costliest operations involved. In our ASC scheme, the sender only performs one pairing ê computation, and the receiver only performs n pairings ê computations. In the IBAS scheme of Selvi and others [13] , each sender only performs one pairing ê computation, but the receiver performs 2n+3 pairings ê computations. Otherwise, the Unsigncrypt algorithm in Selvi and others' IBAS scheme [13] does not explain how to recover the unknown users' signatures from the aggregate signature. Thus, our ASC is more efficient than the IBAS scheme of Selvi and others [13] .
We conducted five experiments for one pairing ê operation using a pairing-based cryptography library [16] 
V. Conclusion
We studied an ASC built upon the identity-based aggregate signature scheme proposed by Selvi and others [9] . Our proposed ASC was formally proven to be secure with respect to its IND-CCA2, AUTH-CMA2, and EUF-CMA security properties in a random oracle model. The ASC does not need the interaction among the signers, which is a requirement in existing efficient aggregate signature schemes, and it is efficient in pairing ê computations.
Appendix:
In Table A1 , we summarize all the notations of our paper. An ASC is said to be semantically secure against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ASC-CCA2) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Definition 2
Definition 3
An ASC is said to be existentially signature unforgeable against chosen message insider attack, or EUF-ASC-CMA secure, if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Theorem 1
Assume there is an IND-ASC-CCA2 adversary A that is able to distinguish two valid Ciphertexts during the game defined in definition 1 with non-negligible advantage and asking Keygen queries, Signcrypt queries, and Unsigncrypt queries, then there exists a simulator C that can solve an instance of the DBDH problem with non-negligible advantage.
Theorem 2
The ASC proposed is secure against any probabilistic polynomial-time AUTH-ASC-CMA2 adversary A under the random oracle model if the DL problem is hard in G 1 .
Theorem 3
The ASC proposed is secure against any probabilistic polynomial-time EUF-ASC-CMA adversary A under the random oracle model if the DBDH problem is hard in G 1 .
Xun-Yi Ren received his BS in computer application from the University of Science and Technology, Beijing, China, in 1998, and his MS in management science and PhD in information networks, from Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China, in 2004 and 2008, respectively. At present, he is an associate professor in the Department of Information Security, in the College of Computer, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China. His current research interests include information security, grid & cloud computing, and machine learning.
